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LEADERSHIP CATEGORIES AND SOCIAL PROCESSES IN 
ISLAM:  THE CASES OF DIR AND SWAT 
Charles Lindholm 
 
     Political leaders in Muslim societies have often been religious leaders as well.  The 
separation of church and state has never been an Islamic precept; in fact, from the very 
beginning Islam has asserted a right to dominance in the political realm.  In this paper I 
intend to show how several Muslim political actors in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier 
Province use indigenous Islamic categories in their struggles for power.  But the 
categories are not completely plastic, to be manipulated at will.  The actors are 
themselves constrained, and their actions structured, by these same concepts and beliefs. 
     The religion of these tribal leaders is not, however, equivalent to the religion of 
Muslim urbanites.  Islam is a faith both of orthopraxy and orthodoxy, of action and of 
learning, of local belief and of scholarly exegesis.  This difference in emphasis has been 
correlated to the mundane realities of rural and urban life.  The urbanite lives in history 
and is aware of the chaos of contingency, the multiplicity of realities to choose from, the 
absence of any certainty in the flux of change; the villager, on the other hand, lives in 
nature and sees continuity and order both in the pattern of the seasons and in the highly 
personalized structure of his society.  The city dweller wishes to capture history and 
create order through the learning of the scholar, while the tribesman/peasant stresses 
repetition, ritual, and the personal intercession of charismatic holy men (el-Zein 
1977:248; see also Gellner 1981:114-30 who makes the distinction between the urban 
“doctor” and the rural “saint”). 
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     Furthermore, the tribesman is concerned less with religious interpretation than he is 
with the activity of the holy man as an arbiter.  Living outside the boundaries of the state 
and enmeshed in a culture that is based upon self-help and the feud, tribal Muslims use 
religious  practitioners as go-betweens interposing not only with God but with other men 
as well (Morsy 1984:44-45).  The “saint,” by virtue of his status, his command of 
religious discourse, and his position outside lineage rivalries, has the capacity to 
adjudicate, mediate, and even to unite:  a capacity that makes him indispensable in peace 
as well as a potential leader in war (see Lindholm 1981:153 for the Swati case). 
     The urban and rural traditions are not necessarily antagonistic to one another.  If we 
consider the urban tradition to be that of the Ulema (scholars) and the folk tradition to be 
that of the Sufi, then it is well to remember that in the history of Islam a man could be 
both scholar and ecstatic.  And we should also remember that the rural holy men were 
often trained in the urban centers, while the reformist movements in Islamic history have 
often arisen in the tribal regions.  But, today, challenges of Westernization and 
modernization threaten the tradition of Islam by transforming the economic and social 
base upon which it rests.  In a defensive response, many wish to affirm Islam as absolute 
and unitary, denying the validity of the less articulate (but deeply grounded) traditions of 
the countryside.  The increasing importance of the city and the ever greater power of the 
state have also naturally magnified the religious influence of the center, while the 
practices of the periphery have become suspect.  Perhaps, as some argue, this process is 
irreversible, and Islam will indeed become an orthodox monolith. 
     But the success or failure of this movement does not rest upon the power of argument 
or upon the supposed truth of the reformer’s message.  The pattern Islamic institutions 
will take in the future derives from a complex interaction between local social 
organization and the religious values exemplified by individual actors.  It is not simply a 
case of universal truth overcoming local heresy.  It is more like a discussion between 
different approaches to Islam.  This way of looking at Muslim life is, I believe, within the 
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realm of orthodox interpretation, since Islam is the most democratic of all major 
religions, relying on consensus among believers to determine law.  The reliance on 
consensus is essentially anthropological and contextual.  What the anthropologist 
(whether Muslim or non-Muslim) does is simply to reveal what some believers make of 
their faith.  It is for the future to decide which version is most appropriate; but it is the 
duty of the anthropologist or sociologist to present the version of the people he has 
studied, so that their reality, which is unwritten, can also be made a party to the 
discussion. 
     The method I wish to use in my contribution is comparative and historical, showing 
the activities of several political figures over time and explaining some social correlates 
for what appear to be quite radical shifts in the emphasis on religious institutions and 
values.  The areas chosen for examination are Swat and Dir, where I did anthropological 
fieldwork for approximately two years starting in 1968 and ending in 1977.  Much of the 
material I  will use in this comparison is from this fieldwork and is not generally 
available in the literature (Ahmed 1976; Barth 1959a; Caroe 1965; Wadud 1965), though 
some of it can be found in my ethnography (Lindholm 1982a) and in an earlier paper 
(Lindholm 1982b).  The specific configuration I wish to render intelligible is as follows:  
Dir has been for generations a secular state, yet it has recently witnessed an impressive 
movement toward leadership by religious figures; Swat, on the other hand, was founded 
and ruled by religious charismatics, yet politics there has been increasingly secularized. 
 
THE SETTING:  SWAT AND DIR 
 
     Those who have lived in Pakistan certainly will know Swat and Dir, if not by personal 
acquaintance, then by legend.  Swat is “the Switzerland of Pakistan,” a lush valley 
nestled in high mountains with good trout streams and spectacular scenery.  The royal 
family, now deposed, has a well-earned reputation for urbanity and sophistication, and 
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Swat itself is perceived as the most “advanced” of the frontier regions.  Dir, a valley just 
to the northwest of Swat, is in some respects in marked antithesis to its neighbor.  It is dry 
and harsh, and difficult of access.  Dir too had a royal family, also now deposed, but it 
took pride in its conservatism and isolation:  traits shared by the valley as a whole.  The 
two valleys thus offer strong contrasts in some ways, yet they are much alike in others.  
Both are dominated by Yusufzai Pukhtun (landholding tribesmen), both stress the code of 
Pukhtunwali with its values of revenge, refuge, and the offering of hospitality, both 
practice rigid purdah, both are populated by strict Sunni Muslims.  In other words, not 
only are the inhabitants of the two valleys cousins genealogically, but also in terms of 
social life. 
     The similarity I wish to emphasize here is structural.  Both societies understand their 
social world through the use of a segmentary lineage model.  This model, typical of 
Middle Eastern tribal peoples, bases alliance and antagonism on patrilineal kinship.  
Kinship determines inheritance of land, so that close male relatives live and work next to 
one another and are rivals with one another for the land of their common ancestor.  This 
patterned rivalry extends throughout the two regions, so that individuals oppose 
neighbors in a ward, wards oppose other wards in a village, and villages oppose one 
another within a district (see Lindholm 1981).  This model has been discussed and argued 
about ad infinitum, and I will not distract the reader with a restatement of the pros and 
cons of using it as an interpretive device.  I will only note that the most crucial aspects of 
Pukhtun life, such as land rights, obligations to take blood revenge, political alliances, 
and residence, are all built up through the segmentary structure and also that all recent 
writers on the NWFP have accepted the local model and found it a valuable tool for 
understanding Pukhtun social life (Hart 1985; Ahmed 1976, 1980; Lindholm 1982a). 
     The model is, however, crosscut and complicated by a dual bloc system of political 
and marriage alliances, so  that each genealogical unit is in fact split in two.  The dualistic 
blocs (dullah ) have made for many misinterpretations of the Pukhtun social system, with 
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bloc alliances being taken as the foundation of the structure  (see, for example, Barth 
1959a:113).  However, like the dualistic political alliances of other Middle Eastern 
tribesmen, the most famous being the liff of the Berbers (Montagne 1973; Gellner 
1969:67; Hart 1970:45), the parties are actually an artifact of lineage rivalries between 
close male relatives.  In daily life, a man’s opponent is his most powerful cousin, and he 
allies himself with more distant relatives against this cousin on the ancient political 
axiom that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”  Three elements are really involved 
here:  the manipulating political individual, his temporary allies, and his temporary 
opponents.  Each person is acting in his own personal interests against his most salient 
opponents and will switch sides with alacrity when advantage is perceived.  For instance, 
if one cousin is very successful in his political maneuverings, he will find his allied 
cousins joining his enemies to humble him.  This leads to a long-term balance of 
oppositions (Barth 1959b:15-19).  But political alliances do not supersede blood ties, and 
a man must take revenge if a close cousin who is an enemy is killed by a genealogically 
more distant political ally (Salzman 1978:62). 
     Another element worthy of note here is the important role of third-party intervention 
in this structure.  Opposing lineages may be incited to war by neighbors who hope to 
obtain advantage from the violence, while outside groups may also be recruited to help a 
warring party gain an upper hand in the struggle.  But outsiders are also utilized to unite 
lineages in battle against external aggression and to mediate between segments engaged 
in interminable feud.  These latter functions are, in fact, the specific duties of the holy 
lineages and religious charismatics of the valleys.  Holding authority by virtue of their 
conduct and heritage, religious figures have stood symbolically outside the hostility of 
the segmentary system.  The Pukhtun, who will cede authority to no other man, will give 
way to the word and leadership of one who is an emissary of Allah.  As Evans Pritchard 
(1949:87) writes, the tribesmen’s “need was for some authority lying outside their 
segmentary lineage system which could compose intertribal and sectional disputes and 
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bind the tribes and tribal sections together within an organization and under a common 
symbol.”  This is a need filled by religious practitioners. 
 
TYPOLOGIES OF RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP:  FROM MAHDI TO MUFTI 
      
Ahmed (1983) has distinguished three ideal types of religious figure in this region:  
the mullah, the Sufi, and the Sayyid.  The contrast is roughly between the learned man 
(who is a servant of the village and officiates at the mosque), the ecstatic charismatic 
leader, and the descendant of the Prophet who validates his authority by reference to 
genealogy.  These categories actually meld one into the  other.  The mullah is rarely very 
learned and may become a charismatic leader (as Ahmed documents) and may, perhaps, 
even dare to claim Sayyid status.  Sayyids, despite their genealogies, may sink to earning 
their livings by reciting from the Koran or working as landless laborers, while some 
successful Sayyids may validate their position by following “sufi” practices.  Sufis are 
also not so simple to classify and, like the Sayyids, also have a genealogical charter.  As 
Trimingham (1971) documents, there is a general evolution in Islamic tradition from the 
charismatic individual to the formation of a religious school and the eventual 
institutionalization into a cult.  Even within this framework, the positions are not always 
clear.  For instance, the Sanusi described by Evans-Pritchard (1949) were an orthodox 
order, but were seen by the Bedouin as a cult.  Nor was the mullah described by Ahmed 
of one type.  Instead, he attempted to move “up” from the inferior category of 
mullah/village servant to the exalted role of ecstatic leader, “alternating between a secular 
political program and a religious-charismatic one” (Ahmed 1983:160). 
     Rather than use Ahmed’s triadic schema, I would like here to follow the four-stage 
model offered by Brett (1980), who uses movement between learned (Mufti), warrior 
(Murabit), arbitrator (Marabout), and inspirational leader (Mahdi) to understand Islamic 
history in North Africa.  This model, which focuses on leadership, may allow us to 
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escape a strict dichotomy between secular and religious action and to see the larger 
pattern.  Brett’s processual argument, enriched with detail on the interaction between 
social organization and religious institutions, should help us make sense of the apparently 
counterintuitive historical movements of Swat and Dir. 
     In order to understand these movements, we need to look more closely at the historical 
and environmental contexts.  As mentioned above, Swat is richer and far more populous 
than Dir.  “Swat is soft, Dir is hard,” says a local proverb.  This difference has had a 
profound effect on the evolution of political hierarchies in the two regions.  A further 
divergence concerns the surrounding political structures.  Both Swat and Dir are at the 
very edges of the Pukhtun world, a world that, like all segmentary lineage systems, tends 
to expand at the expense of less well organized neighbors (Sahlins 1961).  But whereas 
the northern frontier of Swat faces the harsh mountains and fierce but impoverished 
peoples of Kohistan, Dir instead looked toward the wealthy and ancient kingdom of 
Chitral. 
     The effect these two factors has had on the evolution of leadership in Swat and Dir is 
profound.  Dir, unlike other mountain tribal regions, has had a centralized state from the 
seventeenth century.  The Painda khel lineage, living in the furthest northern regions, 
managed to decisively defeat Chitral and achieve hegemony throughout Dir, so that 
Elphinstone, writing in the Early nineteenth century, was able to report that Qasin Khan, 
the head of the Painda khel, was “by far the most powerful Khaun among the  
Eusofzyes…He can imprison, inflict corporal punishment, and even put to death.”i Swat, 
on the other hand, had a more typical Pukhtun system of shallow hierarchies, continually 
shifting alliances, and internal warfare, interrupted only by moments of unity inspired by 
attempted invasion. 
     The causes for the variation in political structure lie in the factors cited above.  Dir, 
unlike Swat, faced a sophisticated and wealthy kingdom at its northern border.  This is a 
classic situation for the evolution of secondary state systems.ii   In attempting to conquer 
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and subdue Chitral, Dir itself developed centralization, a centralization that was validated 
by success and by booty.  Swat did not have this opportunity for state building.  Instead, 
the Swati Pukhtun were fought to a standstill in the mountain lairs of the Kohistani, who 
had neither booty to take nor an organization to copy.  Dir, then, built up a centralized 
hierarchy through confrontation and through the wealth extorted from Chitral.  With its 
superior organizational and economic capacity, the powerful Painda khel lineage was 
able to move south and bring under its sway the relatively sparse population of the rest of 
the valley and to establish a long-lasting kingdom.  The situation in Swat did not permit 
such a movement.  Even a strong lineage could not move south into the densely 
populated lowlands.  The resistance was simply too massive.  A low surrounding 
population density and the proximity of a wealthy state to emulate and exploit were the 
primary factors in the evolution of Dir into a small but powerful kingdom. 
     So far, I have discussed the two areas as if they had no relationship with one another.  
But in fact their relationship is crucial to understanding the further permutations of 
politics, religion, and leadership in the area.  I have mentioned above the role of third-
party intervention in local quarrels.  This pattern is pervasive in segmentary systems.  As 
Schomberg (1935:242) writes, “there have always been two parties in these lawless lands.  
When one party weakens, it begins to intrigue with some neighboring ruler, hoping to 
induce him to come in, occupy the country and enable his supporters to work off their 
vendettas on the stronger opponents, and so redress the balance. of power.”  In Swat, it 
was the Dir Nawab who was so invited.  But then, finding the solution worse than the 
original problem, the Swati Pukhtun would unite on the principle of segmentary 
solidarity and act “to repel the common enemy.”iii   This violent method of “redressing 
the balance” apparently functioned fairly well until thrown out of equilibrium by the 
intervention of the British. 
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Colonial intervention had important ramifications for the political/religious life of 
both Dir and Swat.  Some of its effects in Swat have already been discussed at length by 
Ahmed (1976:84-129) and myself (Lindholm 1977:46-50,  1982a:38-43), but here I will 
try to link the developments in Swat with those in Dir and bring both under the typologies 
proposed by Brett. 
     Continued external pressure, first from the Sikhs and then from the British, pushed the 
Swatis toward establishing some form of central authority to coordinate resistance.  The 
onslaught was envisioned as a threat to Islam, and the leaders who arose came from the 
class of charismatic religious figures.  This pattern is implicit in segmentary society, 
since the temptation for betrayal is inherent within the social structure, as I showed in my 
discussion of the role of personal interest and manipulation.  The only bond of unity is 
embodied in the person of a charismatic claiming authority not for himself or his lineage, 
but as a representative of Allah.  In Swat, Abdul Gaffur, a Sufi whose austerities and 
piety had made him well known, was tagged by the Pukhtun as the symbolic figure about 
whom they could rally.  In Brett’s terms, he was viewed as a Mahdi, one of the “rightly 
guided” who provides the faithful with a transcendent order that can subsume lineage 
rivalries. 
     After the defeat of the British at Ambela in 1863, Swat no longer suffered under the 
same threat of invasion, and the image of the Mahdi was no longer appropriate to the 
situation (nor, indeed, was it an image that Abdul Gaffur seemed happy to adopt).  
Instead, he slipped into the role Brett calls Marabout, a holy man charged with 
maintaining social order as a judge and arbitrator whose authority is sanctioned by 
supposed mystic power.  Such persons, as mentioned above, function within the 
fragmented and internally hostile segmentary society as the means for defusing tensions; 
they cease to have a place when the society becomes centralized, and their position is 
taken by Brett’s Muftis.  Acting within the Maraboutic framework as judge through the 
rest of his life, Abdul Gaffur acquired considerable property and prosperity by way of 
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gifts from the beneficiaries of his judgments and from believers anxious to gain grace 
through their donations.  His political authority, however, was negligible, as the Pukhtun 
of Swat returned to their social world of factional struggles and party warfare. 
     Dir offers an elucidating contrast.  The Dir Nawab in his traditional guise is perhaps 
best characterized as a Murabit in Brett’s terms.  By distinguishing Murabit and 
Marabout, Brett is dividing what is seen in North Africa as one and the same—the two 
terms are actually different spellings of one word.  But there is an important shift in 
emphasis.  Whereas the Marabout is a mediator and keeper of order, the Murabit is a 
warrior and conqueror “in the cause of God,” a ruler as well as a judge.  This is the role 
characteristic of segmentary leaders in eras of expansion.  In such periods when the 
structure is not threatened, but is instead waxing larger and more powerful, when booty is  
available to satisfy the followers, then the temptation to betray is greatly lessened.  
Religious sanction is nonetheless important for strengthening the hearts of the warriors 
and justifying the cause, but the central figure is interested primarily in practical matters 
of war and rule.  In Dir, for instance, the Painda khel lineage held its power by its success 
in war but justified itself by claiming descent from a Pukhtun Sufi given mystical rights 
to rule the valley by his master.  The validation of power through legends of this sort is 
widespread in the frontier. 
     Beneath these warrior/ruler figures are men who fall into the Mufti category:  the 
learned who are used to back up the ruler’s right to power, to administer his army and 
court, and to take the place of the dangerously independent Marabout judges and 
mediators.  The famous Shaikh Mali, who organized land redistribution when the 
Yusufzai first entered the frontier region, was such a figure:  a Sayyid who was 
administrative second-in-command of the invading army.  Similar men were used by the 
Dir Nawab and, later, by his rival, the Wali of Swat, as advisors, judges, and bureaucrats 
at the middle level of governmental authority.  But such men can also act as centers for 
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resistance, since they may deny the ruler’s legitimacy, claiming that he has overstepped 
the bounds of piety in his use of power.      
 
NAWAB AND BADSHAH:  TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE CATEGORIES      
 
To return to the historical process, the legitimacy of the Dir Nawab remained 
unquestioned while his family presided over expansion but began to crumble when that 
expansion ceased.  In 1888 a rebellion in the Jandul region neighboring Dir forced the 
Nawab (Mohammad Sherif Khan) into exile in Swat.  At this point, the British again 
reenter the picture. 
     After Swati levies under the charismatic religious leadership of Abdul Gaffur held off 
the forces of the Raj at Ambela, the colonial power opted for a less-costly approach to 
dominating the tribes by seeking alliances with existing rulers, such as the Dir Nawab 
and the Mehtar of Chitral.  When the Dir Nawab was thrown out of his kingdom, the 
British hoped to avoid direct intervention.   But in 1895 the colonial garrison at Chitral 
was besieged, forcing the British to act to protect their interests.  Regular troops joined 
the Dir Nawab’s tribal army and marched through Swat towards Dir.  Meanwhile, other 
colonial troops marched from Gilgit and defeated the rebel army, driving the leader into 
exile in Kabul.  Afraid of further uprisings, the British committed themselves to massive 
support for the Dir Nawab.  Large subsidies were awarded to buy arms and loyalty.  
Furthermore, the Nawab was given absolute rule over Jandul and Sind in southern Dir.  
From being in retreat and nearly broken, the kingdom of Dir was once again expanding 
and solid, but only through alliance with the British. 
     This pact was soon tested.  Aided by Dir, the British had set up permanent outposts in 
Swat.  Incensed by this encroachment, Swat rose in 1897 under the charismatic  
leadership of a Mahdi figure the British called the Mastan Mullah.  Dir was not moved by 
cries of jihad and supported the British against their old enemies/cousins in Swat.  A 
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large number of Swatis were killed in the resulting cataclysmic defeat.  The “cause of 
God” had taken second place, for the Dir Nawab, to the realities of power. 
     With British support, and helped by continued party warfare within Swat, Dir soon 
invaded Swat once again.  And again, as had occurred before, Swat united behind a 
religious charismatic to expel the invader.  But casualties were higher than ever, and it 
seemed that the alliance between the British and Dir would end with Swat eventually 
losing its autonomy.  The power of the Dir Nawab (Aurangzeg Khan, who had succeeded 
his father) was at its peak, and his victories had only whetted his appetite for more.  
     At this point, the Swati lineage leaders met to elect someone to head the resistance.  
The man they eventually selected and entitled the Badshah of Swat was Abdul Wadud, 
who was the grandson of Abdul Gaffur.   Because of this, many looked on him as a 
Mahdi figure.  He utilized this image to rally the Pukhtun behind him and to once again 
defeat Dir.  But, unlike his grandfather, Abdul Wadud was a veteran of very secular 
lineage struggles, and he had fought and killed his two cousins to assert his authority in 
his own group.  Now that he had gained power in the whole valley, he was not willing to 
give it up and settle into being a Marabout mediator, as had his grandfather.  Instead, he 
stepped into the role of Murabit, the conqueror, solidifying his rule by invading Buner to 
the east. 
     But the politically astute Badshah knew that the possibilities for further conquest were 
limited and that his rule could not last without external support.  Like the Dir Nawab, he 
looked to the British, who, on their part, were glad to see some form of central authority 
in Swat with whom they could negotiate.  Furthermore, the British were looking for an 
alternative to the Dir Nawab, who had not permitted any cultural inroads into Dir.  The 
Badshah, as a shaky newcomer to power, was more than willing to listen to and emulate 
the British, and he quickly built a network of roads and telephones that consolidated his 
power.  But this was not all; he also built Western-style schools and hospitals and 
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installed a system of formal courts.  Meanwhile, the only Western innovation permitted 
in Dir was the use of a veterinarian to tend to the Nawab’s kennel. 
     The relation between the British and the Badshah was a close one, and it was useful 
for both sides.  The British gained a brilliant and modernizing supporter, who was 
strongly allied to them, while the Badshah gained British backing, which helped make his 
state impervious to attack from either the inside or the outside.  Dir was forced to sign a 
treaty of nonintervention in Swat—a treaty in which Swat was given the lush valley of 
Shamozai, while Dir was awarded the arid region of Adinzai:  a trade-off that perfectly 
marked the new balance of power in this region. 
     In Dir, the era of expansion was at an end, and even the conquests gained in the last 
few years were lost.  The warrior ruling house, which had relied on expansion to 
legitimize its power, was now ravaged by internal splits and antagonisms.  Segmentary 
hostility led to party opposition between close agnates that tore the valley apart for sixty 
years.  After the departure of the British, favoritism was still shown to the Badshah and 
his family, while Dir was still backward and still racked by warfare and schism.  During 
this period one of Aurangzeb Khan’s grandsons, Shahbuddin, began to gain a following 
by calling for Islamic reform and strict adherence to the Koran.  He himself took the role 
of imam (preacher) in the mosque, where he raised an outcry against religious laxity and 
exhorted the people against impious rulers, while at the same time proposing himself as 
the symbol of piety.  Simultaneously, he allied himself with the Mishwani, landless 
migrants from Afghanistan, to whom he became a patron and something of a savior.  
Shahbuddin thus moved from the pure assertion of secular leadership in expansionistic 
war to a more complex transitional position, combining elements from various categories 
according to the needs of the different constituencies.  To the Mishwani, he was 
something of a warrior offering them the spoils of conquest, something of a prophet 
leading them out of oppression to the promised land.  To other people of Dir, he appeared 
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as an outraged cleric defending the faith, a position that also moves in the direction of the 
Mahdi exemplar. 
     As mentioned above, the segmentary structure favors charismatic religious leadership 
in periods of external threat, while an expanding system tends toward secular 
administrators.  In Dir, the threat was actually internal, as stagnation crumbled the power 
base of the Nawab.  But Shahbuddin (aided by his father, Shah Jehan) now attempted to 
stimulate a siege mentality in order to restore the power of the ruling house, not as weak 
Murabits, but as powerful Mahdis.  Shahbuddin claimed that the policies of Pakistan 
were against Islamic practice.  Outsiders who had entered Dir to administer the few 
hospitals and schools that had been built there were singled out as heathens, and the 
institutions themselves were called un-Islamic.  These allegations did stir up the people, 
but they also caused problems with Pakistan. 
     As Shahbuddin stressed prophetic religion in Dir, Swat moved in the opposite 
direction.  The Badshah, far from favoring the rise of religious charismatics, took the 
precaution of banishing all mendicants and Sufic wanderers from the valley.  His own 
Islamic practice was austere and orthodox, but he carefully denied himself any sacred 
role and made no claim to fill the holy position held by his grandfather.  His sons, 
meanwhile, were wearing Western suits, learning English, and going to Europe for their 
holidays.  At the same time, he favored a rationalization of the structure, utilizing 
educated men of religious lineage as bureaucrats and administrators, thus replacing the 
Marabout with the cleric.  Working in tandem with the  secular British Empire and 
presiding over a state expanding in resources, if not in territory, his policies were 
eminently suited to the real situation, just as Shahbuddin’s approach suited the reality of 
Dir.  Both men were acting within categories structured by social organization and by 
indigenous models of religious and secular leadership. 
     Shahbuddin’s efforts, however, were thwarted by intervention from an enemy he 
himself had conjured up:  the Pakistani state.  His elder brother, Kushrow Khan, plotted 
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with Pakistan to overthrow Shahbuddin and Shah Jehan, and in 1960 they were arrested 
and exiled.  Kushrow Khan hoped to copy the Badshah and construct a modern state, 
drawing the resources and support of Pakistan, just as the Badshah had done with the 
British.  But his situation was not analogous.  Whereas the Badshah has been elected and 
was in fact ruling an expanding system, Kushrow Khan was a usurper attempting to stem 
a tide of religious revivalism in a crumbling state.  Having removed his brother from 
consideration as charismatic leader, Kushrow Khan thought himself secure, forgetting 
that charismatic figures are more likely to appear not among princes, but from groups 
challenging traditional authority.  And, indeed, new claimants to leadership in Dir did 
arise from the religious classes that have historically been the focus for popular 
discontent:  the mullahs and Sufi mediators and mendicants.  Furthermore, the Mishwani 
did not accept Kushrow as his brother’s successor.  In 1969, resentment against Pakistan 
and Kushrow Khan erupted into violence; almost all government offices, schools, and 
hospitals were destroyed in an upsurge of religious fervor.  From being the staunchest 
ally of the British, Dir had become the center for rebellion against Pakistan. 
     Swat, in contrast, had evolved from being the most troublesome region to being the 
most tractable and the most “advanced.”  The Badshah peacefully abdicated in favor of 
his eldest son, who was entitled the Wali.  The Wali increasingly rationalized and 
modernized the state, while strengthening ties with Pakistan.  In fact, Pakistan’s President 
Ayub married two of his daughters into the Swati royal family.  In comparison with Dir, 
internal and external relations in Swat were remarkably amicable. 
     All of this was not to last.  Soon after the rebellion in Dir, the princely states were 
completely merged into Pakistan and the rulers were deposed.  The reasons for this move 
are too complex to be discussed here (see Lindholm 1982b:34-35 for more on this topic0, 
but the consequences tend to validate the point of view offered in this paper.  In Swat, 
where the state was founded by a man of religious lineage, the trend has been toward 
greater secularism (see Lindholm 1979:497-505 for a detailed account).  In the 1977 
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elections, the north was dominated by parties led by khans who said little or nothing 
about religion.  In the south, the Badshah’s family split into opposing segments along the 
lines of party formation traditional in segmentary systems.  Neither of the segments, 
however, professed any great religious fervor. 
      These trends are continuations of the process I have outlined in the preceding pages.  
In the era of the Badshah, Swat had extended its influence far beyond the borders of the 
valley. Expansionist and practical, the Swati royal family utilized the clerical 
bureaucratic tradition of the Mufti administrators under the rulership of the Badshah, a 
Murabit warrior.  The Badshah was himself descended from the charismatic Abdul 
Gaffur, who became a Marabout-like mediator after his task of defense was 
accomplished.  This heritage helped the Badshah in his climb to power, but it was one he 
specifically repudiated.  It is noteworthy in documenting this process that the shrine of 
Abdul Gaffur, formerly a major pilgrimage center, gradually lost its following as the 
Badshah and his family secularized and gained control over a state that was increasingly 
rational in structure.  This process was completed by the Badshah’s son, who succeeded 
his father to the throne in 1962 and who dismantled old personal patronage ties in favor 
of more efficient bureaucratic relations.  He himself, Western influenced and 
modernizing, was far more a professional than his warrior father—a Mufti rather than a 
Murabit (Barth 1985).  The evolution in Swat is therefore from a fragmented system 
under attack, appropriate for the rise of a unifying leader; to one of “institutionalized 
dissidence” without central rule, where a mediator-judge finds his niche; to an expansive 
centralized state, where the warrior holds sway; and finally to a bureaucracy, which needs 
the literacy and skills of the clerical class and rule by a professional administrator. 
     After the fall of the royal family, the process continued, with the present political 
leaders competing on the ground of Pakistani politics for advantages and favors.  Instead 
of descending back to the welter of local rivalries typical of segmentary systems in 
stagnation, Swat now sought to assert itself in the new arena for political warriors:  the 
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national state.  It is, it seems, a nice example of the well-known Weberian progress from 
charismatic to rational authority. 
     But Weber saw the movement as irreversible, whereas any student of Islam knows it is 
not.  In Dir, as we have seen, leadership has become less secular and has taken on a 
highly prophetic tone.  In the 1977 elections, Kushrow Khan lost his race to a charismatic 
Sufi, while the other successful candidate was a mullah in a local mosque.  In contrast to 
Swat, the people of Dir did not see participation in Pakistan as an opportunity.  Instead, it 
was perceived as a threat.  As a result, Dir rose again in 1976 against the government of 
Pakistan, which had attempted to intervene in the allocation of wood rights.  This further 
stimulated religious revivalism. 
      
CONCLUSION 
      
At this point, I would like to conclude my excursion into ideal types.  The perils of 
such a venture are many, and I must stress that the categories I have drawn have value not 
as absolutes, but only as guidelines for  understanding cultural complexity.  The historical 
record shows that one man can fill several roles and that the movement from one to the 
other is by no means unidirectional, but is contingent upon many factors of time, place, 
and person.  Nonetheless, the categories do help us link structural features with 
leadership types in the context of religion in a way that helps to make sense of the 
vicissitudes of frontier politics.  This paper stops in 1977.  Events since have been 
complicated by increased Islamic revivalism in Pakistan itself.  In an earlier paper 
(Lindholm 1977:64), I claimed that the study of tribal politics can teach us much about 
the politics of the Middle Eastern state.  I leave it to the reader to decide whether this new 
effort, connecting structural patterns with a typology of leadership and religion, adds any 
further strength to that claim. 
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